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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Kelly A. Bowman appeals from the district court’s order that she pay restitution in the
amount of $5,000.00 to U.S. Bank for her unauthorized withdrawals from her ailing mother’s
bank account. On appeal, she challenges the order on two bases: First, she alleges that either
U.S. Bank was not a victim for purposes of restitution as a matter of law or that there was
insufficient evidence to show that U.S. Bank suffered $5,000.00 in losses due to her criminal
conduct. Second, she asserts that there was insufficient evidence to prove $5,000.00 in economic
loss.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
Following a jury trial, Bowman was convicted of grand theft for fraudulently
withdrawing several thousand dollars from her mother’s bank account. (R., p.75; Tr., p.237,
Ls.8-25.) The district court entered judgment against Bowman and imposed a unified sentence
of three years with one year fixed, suspended that sentence, and placed Bowman on probation for
a period of four years. (R., pp.104-05.) The district court left the issue of restitution open for a
later proceeding. (Tr., p.252, Ls.2-3; p.256, Ls.10-11.) In the meantime, it asked Bowman to
reconcile with her family and “figure out restitution as quickly as possible” and “start paying
restitution as quickly as possible.” (Tr., p.255, Ls.1-3.)
A few months later, the parties convened at the first restitution hearing. The state had
initially requested $5,903.36 (R., pp.111-12), but reduced that request to $5,000.00 during the
hearing (Tr., p.267, Ls.6-11; see also R., p.122). Bowman objected to all restitution on the
grounds that her mother had died. (Tr., p.267, L.21 – p.268, L.10.) The district court rejected
that argument. (Tr., p.268, Ls.11-17.) In the alternative, Bowman calculated her restitution
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obligation at $546.00. (Tr., p.270, Ls.10-11.) The state entered the police report of Bowman’s
theft as State’s Exhibit 1 (Tr., p.264, Ls.1-6; p.266, Ls.21-23) and sought to enter an exhibit from
trial (State’s Exhibit 1B) that detailed Bowman’s theft (Tr., p.270, L.21 – p.271, L.7). The
district court continued the hearing to the following day at the parties’ request. (Tr., p.262, L.21
– p.263, L.1; p.267, Ls.12-17; p.270, Ls.14-18.)
At the second restitution hearing, held the following day, the district court took judicial
notice of State’s Exhibit 1B. (Tr., p.273, L.23 – p.274, L.6.) Bowman objected to the requested
restitution of $5,000 because it “seem[ed] … arbitrary” based on State’s Exhibit 1B. (Tr., p.274,
Ls.9-20.) Instead, Bowman sought to enter her own exhibit, Defense Exhibit A, which purported
to itemize deposits Bowman had made back into her mother’s account against her fraudulent
theft. (Tr., p.280, Ls.12-19.) But the exhibit claimed (among other things) payday loans—taken
out in the victim’s name, using the victim’s identity—as “deposits” into the account, even though
Bowman then spent the money deposited and never paid it back. (Tr., p.284, L.13 – p.285,
L.23.) It also failed to list several of Bowman’s unauthorized withdrawals. (Tr., p.287, L.14 –
p.291, L.7; p.292, Ls.2-14; p.292, L.22 – p.293, L.6.)

Bowman ultimately conceded that

Defense Exhibit A was not accurate (Tr., p.293, Ls.18-25), and the district court excluded it on
the basis that it was not true and accurate (Tr., p.294, Ls.1-18). The restitution hearing was again
continued, this time at Bowman’s request. (Tr., p.296, L.4 – p.297, L.13.)
At the following restitution hearing, held February 28, 2017, the defense presented to the
court, without objection, an email from Bowman’s sister. (2/28/2017 Tr., p.2, L.6 – p.3, L.12;
see
- -also
--

PSI, pp.251-52.) In that email, Ms. Frank (the victim’s other daughter) asserted that she

had helped the victim manage her finances before her death on December 18, 2016. (PSI,
p.251.) According to Ms. Frank, U.S. Bank reimbursed the victim in full for all of Bowman’s
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unauthorized withdrawals that had been highlighted and presented in court.

(Id.; -see --also

2/28/2017 Tr., p.4, L.17 – p.5, L.1.) As detailed in State’s Exhibit 1B, these highlighted
withdrawals totaled more than $5,900.00. (See Aug., pp.9-19 (State’s Ex. 1B).) Based on the
sister’s email, the state replaced the estate of the direct victim with U.S. Bank as the victim for
purposes of restitution. (2/28/2017 Tr., p.5, L.22 – p.6, L.2.) At defense counsel’s request, the
district court again continued the restitution hearing. (Id., p.7, Ls.19-21.)
At the final restitution hearing, held the following day, the prosecutor explained how he
arrived at his figure of an even $5,000.00 of restitution. (Tr., p.299, L.21 – p.301, L.24.)
Bowman acknowledged that U.S. Bank was entitled to at least $908.06 based on State’s Exhibit
1B, but contested that there was evidence to support the award of $5,000.00. (Tr., p.302, L.8 –
p.303, L.18.) It was clear to the district court, however, based on the evidence before it, that
Bowman owed more than $5,000.00 in restitution. (Tr., p.308, Ls.22-24.) The district court
specifically found that the victim, for purposes of restitution, had changed from Bowman’s
mother to U.S. Bank. (Tr., p.308, L.24 – p.309, L.1.) The district court agreed that $5,000.00
was an appropriate amount for restitution, and ordered the restitution. (Tr., p.309, Ls.1-11; R.,
pp.120-21.)
Bowman filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.126-29.)
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ISSUES
Bowman states the issues on appeal as:
I.
Did the district court abuse its discretion by ordering Ms. Bowman to pay
$5,000 in restitution to U.S. Bank because the bank did not actually suffer $5,000
in economic loss as a result of Ms. Bowman’s crime?
II.
If Ms. Garton’s estate is entitled to her restitution award, did the district
court abuse its discretion by ordering Ms. Bowman to pay $5,000 in restitution
because the evidence was insufficient to prove $5,000 in economic loss?
(Appellant’s brief, p.6.)
The state consolidates and rephrases the issue as:
Has Bowman failed to show that the district court abused its discretion by ordering
restitution?
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ARGUMENT
Bowman Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Ordering Her
To Pay Restitution
A.

Introduction
Bowman claims that the district court abused its discretion when it ordered her to pay

restitution to U.S. Bank in the amount of $5,000.00. (Appellant’s brief, pp.7-19.) Application of
the correct legal standards to the facts of this case shows no abuse of the district court’s
discretion.

B.

Standard Of Review
The decision whether to order restitution and in what amount is committed to the trial

court’s discretion. State v. Hill, 154 Idaho 206, 211, 296 P.3d 412, 417 (Ct. App. 2013). The
trial court’s factual findings in relation to restitution will not be disturbed if supported by
substantial evidence. State v. Straub, 153 Idaho 882, 885, 292 P.3d 273, 276 (2013).

C.

The District Court Properly Ordered Bowman To Pay $5,000.00 Partial Restitution To
U.S. Bank For Her Criminal Conduct
Under Idaho Code § 19-5304, a district court may order a convicted defendant to pay

restitution to the victims of that defendant’s criminal conduct. I.C. § 19-5304(2). Under that
statute, a restitution award must be based “upon the preponderance of evidence submitted by the
prosecutor, defendant, victim, or presentence investigator.” State v. Weaver, 158 Idaho 167,
170, 345 P.3d 226, 229 (Ct. App. 2014); I.C. § 19-5304(6). “Each party shall have the right to
present such evidence as may be relevant to the issue of restitution, and the court may consider
such hearsay as may be contained in” the evidence submitted. I.C. § 19-5304(6). A restitution
award “will not be disturbed if supported by substantial evidence.” Id. (citations omitted).
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“Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept to support a
conclusion.” Id. (citing Straub, 153 Idaho at 885, 292 P.3d at 276).
In this case, the district court awarded U.S. Bank $5,000.00 in restitution for Bowman’s
criminal conduct.

(R., pp.120-21.)

That restitution award was supported by substantial

evidence. During the several restitution hearings, the state presented the police report underlying
Bowman’s charges as evidence of her theft. (Tr., p.264, Ls.1-6; PSI, pp.239-48.) The district
court admitted that exhibit into evidence. (Tr., p.266, Ls.21-23.) That report claimed that
Bowman had fraudulently stolen $5,792.30 1 from her mother. (PSI, p.245.) The district court
also took judicial notice of State’s Exhibit 1B, which had been introduced at trial to establish
Bowman’s fraudulent theft from her mother. (Tr., p.273, L.23 – p.274, L.6.) The various
unauthorized withdrawals in State’s Exhibit 1B totaled at least $5,903.36. (See Aug., pp.9-19.)
The defense also submitted, without objection, evidence in the form of an email from Bowman’s
sister explaining that every unauthorized withdrawal Bowman made from her mother’s account
had been reimbursed by U.S. Bank. (PSI, p.251.) The evidence presented at the restitution
hearings thus showed that Bowman fraudulently stole more than $5,000.00 from her mother’s
account, and that U.S. Bank, having reimbursed that account for all of the thefts, was the proper
victim for restitution.

The district court’s restitution award was supported by substantial

evidence and was proper.
In her Appellant’s brief, Bowman raises three arguments against the district court’s
proper restitution award: First, she argues that U.S. Bank is not properly a victim under the
restitution statute, or, if a victim, that U.S. Bank was not entitled to more than $908.06 of the
restitution award, based on the listed credit for fraud adjustments in State’s Exhibit 1B.

1

$2,012.39 + 3,779.91 = $5,792.30.
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(Appellant’s brief, pp.7-12.) Second, she argues that the evidence showed that the victim did not
actually suffer $5,000.00 in economic loss, on the theory that Bowman had previously
reimbursed a portion of that amount. (Appellant’s brief, pp.13-17.) Finally, she argues that the
district court abused its discretion by allowing the state to reduce its request for restitution from
$5,903.36 to $5,000.00.

(Appellant’s brief, pp.17-19.)

Each of these arguments will be

addressed in turn.

1.

Under The Facts Of This Case, U.S. Bank Is Properly Considered The Victim For
Purposes Of Restitution

Bowman argues that U.S. Bank is not a proper victim for restitution because it was not
the direct victim of Bowman’s criminal conduct. (Appellant’s brief, pp.9-10.) This argument is
mistaken. Under the restitution statute, among the definitions for “victim” is
A person or entity who suffers economic loss because such person or
entity has made payments to or on behalf of a directly injured victim pursuant to a
contract including, but not limited to, an insurance contract, or payments to or on
behalf of a directly injured victim to pay or settle a claim or claims against such
person or entity in tort or pursuant to statute and arising from the crime.
I.C. § 19-5304(1)(e)(iv). Under the facts of this case, this definition squarely applies to U.S.
Bank. After their account holder was the victim of fraud, U.S. Bank made payments to that
directly injured victim to compensate her for her losses. (PSI, p.251; see also 2/28/2017 Tr., p.4,
Ls.17-21.) U.S. Bank, therefore, is a victim under the statute and the district court correctly
ordered restitution on its behalf.
Bowman also argues that if U.S. Bank is a victim under the statute, then it is only entitled
to $908.06 because that is the amount of credit for fraud reimbursements listed on the direct
victim’s bank statements that were presented at trial. (Appellant’s brief, pp.10-12.) Bowman’s
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argument fails to consider all of the evidence presented by the parties showing that U.S. Bank
was entitled to full restitution.
As explained above, under Idaho Code § 19-5304(6), the district court should determine
economic loss “based upon the preponderance of evidence submitted to the court by the
prosecutor, defendant, victim or presentence investigator” and “the court may consider such
hearsay as may be contained in” that evidence. At the February 28, 2017, restitution hearing, the
defense submitted a letter from the defendant’s sister, informing the court that U.S. Bank had
reimbursed the victim for all of the fraud suffered on account of Bowman’s criminal conduct.
(See PSI, p.251.) This is evidence of “[e]comonic loss … submitted to the court by the …
defendant….” And, even if hearsay, the district court could properly consider it. The district
court’s award of restitution to U.S. Bank of the $5,000.00 of restitution is therefore supported by
substantial evidence and should not be disturbed on appeal.

2.

Bowman’s Claim That She Reimbursed The Account Was Not Supported By
Substantial Evidence Presented At The Restitution Hearings

Bowman asserts that she already deposited $3,471.00 into her mother’s account, and that
this should count against her restitution balance. (Appellant’s brief, pp.13-17.) However, no
evidence actually received by the district court during restitution shows that Bowman deposited
this amount into her mother’s account. While the defense claimed that, during Bowman’s trial,
the deposits were testified to as being from Bowman, no transcript of the trial proceedings, or
even an audio recording of those proceedings, was ever entered. (See Tr., p.289, Ls.21-23;
p.304, Ls.4-12; p.308, Ls.10-12.) Proposed Defense Exhibit A purported to tie the deposits back
to Bowman (see PSI, pp.249-50; Tr., p.280, Ls.12-19), and Bowman sought to enter that exhibit
during one of the restitution hearings (Tr., p.278, Ls.3-4). But the district court refused the
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exhibit. (Tr., p.294, Ls.1-18; PSI, p.250.) It, therefore, is not evidence, and there is no evidence
tying the deposits back to Bowman.
Even assuming that Bowman could show that she made the claimed deposits into her
mother’s account, that would still not reduce her restitution obligations. Undisputed below, and
established by evidence, in addition to fraudulently stealing from her mother, Bowman also
(legitimately) borrowed at least $2,750.00 from her, given as loans. (Tr., p.280, L.25 – p.282,
L.18.) Bowman’s mother wrote her a check for $1,350 on November 12, 2015 (PSI, p.41), and
another for $1,400 on November 27, 2015 (PSI, p.43). As the state noted below, Bowman’s
argument on deposits back into her mother’s account fails to take these debts into consideration.
(Tr., p.305, L.11 – p.307, L.9.) Any moneys Bowman may have made into her mother’s account
should first be applied to these legitimate debts with her mother, and only then to her fraudulent
thefts. Applying those deposits would leave Bowman with a balance of $721.00. 2 At best,
Bowman could apply that $721.00 against her established fraudulent theft of, alternatively,
$5,903.36 or $5,792.30 from her mother. But even then, the state’s discounted request of
$5,000.00 still favors Bowman.

3.

The State Did Not Violate Bowman’s Rights When It Reduced Its Request For
Restitution, And The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion By Granting
That Reduced Award

Under the statute governing restitution, restitution is not an all or nothing proposition.
Rather, the district court has discretion to order “complete, partial, or nominal” restitution. I.C.
§ 19-5304(2). In this case, the state initially sought $5,903.36 in restitution, based on Bowman’s
fraudulent transactions found in her mother’s bank statements. (R., pp.111-12.) In its review,
however, the police claimed to have discovered $5,792.30 in fraudulent transactions. (PSI,
2

$3,471.00 - $2,750.00 = $721.00.
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p.245.) Recognizing the challenges of accurately calculating Bowman’s total fraudulent theft
from her mother, but certain from the evidence that the theft exceeded $5,000.00, the prosecutor
reduced his restitution request from $5,903.36 to an even $5,000.00. (Tr., p.299, L.21 – p.301,
L.24; R., pp.122-23.)
The district court agreed with the state that $5,000.00 was an appropriate amount of
restitution and commended it for seeking to reduce the amount of restitution it sought. (Tr.,
p.309, Ls.1-11.) Bowman, however, asserts that allowing the state to reduce its request for
restitution, based on difficulties calculating the actual losses, resulted in an abuse of the district
court’s discretion. (Appellant’s brief, pp.17-19.) It does not. First, it is clear from the record
that the district court determined that $5,000.00—while not complete restitution based on the
evidence—was, indeed, an appropriate restitution award. (Tr., p.308, L.22 – p.309, L.11.) In
fact, such a figure appears more in line with the district court’s initial thinking on the issue of
restitution. (See Tr., p.252, Ls.9-18.) Because the law allows an award of partial restitution, the
district court did not abuse its discretion by ordering partial restitution.
Second, the state is aware of no law (and Bowman has cited none) that prohibits it from,
likewise, seeking an award of partial restitution. But even if it was error to allow the state to
reduce the restitution it sought from $5,903.36 to 5,000.00, any such error would have to be
harmless. See I.C.R. 52 (“Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect
substantial rights shall be disregarded”). Bowman certainly suffered no prejudice from being
ordered to pay up to $903.36 less than she might otherwise have been required to pay. There
would appear to be no remedy for Bowman, and this Court should affirm the district court’s
order of restitution.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court’s order requiring
Bowman to pay $5,000.00 in restitution to U.S. Bank.
DATED this 15th day of December, 2017.

/s/ Russell J. Spencer___________________
RUSSELL J. SPENCER
Deputy Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 15th day of December, 2017, served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by emailing an electronic copy to:
JENNY C. SWINFORD
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
at the following email address: briefs@sapd.state.id.us.

/s/ Russell J. Spencer____________________
RUSSELL J. SPENCER
Deputy Attorney General
RJS/dd
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